JULY 2015 BAD FAITH CASES: (1) INSURANCE BAD FAITH STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO SURETIES; (2) PRINCIPLES ALLOWING AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR BAD FAITH CONDUCT IN BRINGING/DEFENDING/PURSUING LITIGATION CANNOT BE USED TO END RUN THE INSURANCE BAD FAITH STATUTE (Philadelphia Federal)
In Board of Trustees, Roofers Union Local 30 v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company the court reiterated, with thorough citation of authority, that Pennsylvania’s insurance bad faith statute does not apply to sureties.
The court also made clear that a plaintiff cannot use the argument that it is entitled to attorney’s fees under a bad faith, wanton, oppressive, and vexatious conduct theory, as such extraordinary relief from the “American Rule” that each side pays its own attorney’s fees in the absence of a statute or contract allocating fees, addresses an entirely different context than the insurance bad faith statute. This exception, as set forth in federal case law cited by the court, “deals with either bad faith initiation/defense of the lawsuit or conduct of the party or its attorney during the course of the litigation—it is not intended as an end run around the insurance bad faith statutes or to punish bad faith that does not involve willful abuse of the judicial process.”
Though not mentioned in this federal opinion discussing Third Circuit case law on awarding attorney’s fees in this limited context, the same argument would likely apply to Pennsylvania statutes 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 2503(6)(7)(9), on the right to receive attorney’s fees as taxable litigation costs:
“The following participants shall be entitled to a reasonable counsel fee as part of the taxable costs of the matter: (6) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees as a sanction against another participant for violation of any general rule which expressly prescribes the award of counsel fees as a sanction for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct during the pendency of any matter. (7) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees as a sanction against another participant for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct during the pendency of a matter. (9) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees because the conduct of another party in commencing the matter or otherwise was arbitrary, vexatious or in bad faith.”
