THIRD CIRCUIT FINDS KVAERNER DOES NOT APPLY TO POLICY USING “EXPECTED OR INTENDED” LANGUAGE TO DEFINE “OCCURRENCE” (Third Circuit)
While not directly a bad faith case, this Third Circuit decision creates an important annotation to the Kvaerner doctrine. Specifically, after last week’s Sapa Extrusions decision, insureds, insurers, and their counsel must now scrutinize the specific definition of “occurrence” to determine if Kvaerner controls, at least in federal courts applying Pennsylvania law. [It is also realistic to expect that Pennsylvania’s state courts will strongly consider Sapa Extrusion’s persuasive value as well.]
The case involved millions of allegedly faulty products sold by the insured to a window contractor, which were then incorporated into millions of windows. Those windows had to be replaced, and the contractor brought suit against the insured. That case settled for a large sum. The insured sought recovery for the settlement sum against 28 different insurance policies.
The District Court found that there was no “occurrence” under the Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court’s Kvaerner decision and its progeny, and ruled for the insurers. The Third Circuit agreed that nineteen of the policies were subject to Kvaerner’s principles, but nine were not. It sent those nine policies back to the District Court for further analysis on whether there could be coverage.
By way of background, in Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 908 A.2d 888 (Pa. 2006), Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court established the principle that faulty workmanship is not an “occurrence,” and therefore is not covered under a liability policy. In, e.g., Millers Capital Insurance Co. v. Gambone Brothers Dev. Co., 941 A.2d 706 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. CPB International, Inc., 562 F.3d 591 (3d Cir. 2009), the courts further explained that Kvaerner’s interpretation of occurrence likewise did not encompass the reasonably foreseeable consequences of faulty workmanship. In the 2013 Indalex case, Pennsylvania’s Superior Court explained that Kvaerner did not govern faulty product claims against the product manufacturer for off-the-shelf products purchased by contractors.
As now set forth in Sapa Extrusions, however, Kvaerner only establishes its meaning of “occurrence” based on the specific policy language at issue in that case, i.e., Kvaerner does not automatically apply to all occurrence policies regardless of how occurrence is defined. Looking at the language of all 28 policies in this case, the Third Circuit found that Kvaerner and its progeny did not apply to some of those policies because their language defining “occurrence” differed from the policy language in Kvaerner.
In Kvaener, occurrence was defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” The Third Circuit called this the “accident definition” of occurrence. Under Kvaerner, this definition measures occurrence by an objective standard of what constitutes an accident, and faulty workmanship cannot objectively constitute an accident by its very nature.
The Third Circuit contrasted the accident definition with the “expected/intended definition” of occurrence. The expected/intended definition defined occurrence “as ‘an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in Bodily Injury or Property Damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the Insured.’” [Emphasis added] This definition is similar to the “injurious exposure definition,” which defines occurrence as “’injurious exposure, including continuous or repeated exposure, to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in personal injury or property damage … neither expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.’” [Emphasis added]
The court found that the expected or intended language created a subjective standard for determining whether an act was an accident, as expressed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision in United Services Automobile Association v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Thus, the Third Circuit found that the “expected or intended” language in the latter two types of policy definitions took the meaning of occurrence outside the objective rule applied in Kvaerner.
The panel concluded:
(1) “For the seven policies that contain the Expected/Intended Definition of ‘occurrence,’ we hold that the Insured’s Intent Clause triggers the subjective-intent standard from Elitzky. We will vacate the District Court’s decision as it relates to these policies and remand for further consideration consistent with this opinion.”
(2) “And for the two policies that contain the Injurious Exposure Definition of ‘occurrence,’ since they also include the Insured’s Intent Clause, we will vacate the District Court’s decision and remand for further consideration consistent with this opinion.”
The court took “no position on whether [the insured] may ultimately recover under any of the policies we are remanding to the District Court for more consideration. Given the extensive record and the amount in controversy, the parties should be afforded the opportunity to develop their coverage arguments, including various theories of triggering conditions, under those policies before the District Court in the first instance.”
Date of Decision: September 13, 2019
Sapa Extrusions, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit No. 18-2206, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27668, 2019 WL 4384187 (3d Cir. Sept. 13, 2019) (Fisher, Porter, Restrepo, JJ.)
